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Abstract 
 
 
This paper tries to reduce moral hazards in an entrepreneur-Angel 
financing relationship. This relationship is usually characterized by mutual 
empathy as opposed to it being absent in a VC relationship.  
We seek to identify optimal payments to an entrepreneur under effort 
shirking in a contract where terms of payments are set at the beginning of the 
project. We use multi-period game theoretic approach and compare the results 
under VC and angel financing.  
The study founds similar insights to VC financing where optimal 
contracts lies in back loading the payments to the entrepreneur. However, if 
mutual empathy exists, then the preference to back-load payments is lessened.  
Another distinguishing feature under angel, as opposed to Vc financing, 
is that increased mutual empathy induces the entrepreneur to be less concerned 
about the back-loading of payments. This leads to the conclusion that, due to 
empathy, the entrepreneur becomes more patient in receiving compensations.  
We also found that mutual empathy leads to higher effort excreted by the 
entrepreneur under angel financing than under Vc financing.  
Another finding is that mutual empathy leads to the entrepreneur being 
less sensitive to changes in payments as compared to Vc financing.  
The findings shed lights on the importance of investing in developing a 
mutual empathetic relationship in entrepreneurial financing. The fact that the 
entrepreneur is less sensitive to payments changes, under an empathetic relation, 
gives the financier an opportunity for cost savings. The fact that the 
entrepreneur is less sensitive to payments timing gives the financier the 
opportunity to even backload the payments and extend the exit stage. 
